



Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey

Author(s): Nur Yalman

Source: *Daedalus*, Winter, 1973, Vol. 102, No. 1, Post-Traditional Societies (Winter, 1973), pp. 139-168

Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20024113>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

American Academy of Arts & Sciences and The MIT Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Daedalus*

NUR YALMAN

Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey

Extreme forms of repudiation of the past . . . are the analogues of the complete destruction of the past—which in its cult form is expressed by destroying property . . . such as occurs in ‘cargo cults’ and in small apocalyptic cults in our own society. Only by the destruction of every vestige of the past can the new order be ushered in . . . this will turn out to be one of the universal characteristics of human psychology.

—Margaret Mead, *New Lives for Old*

Violence in the colonies does not only have for its aim the keeping of these enslaved men at arm’s length, it seeks to dehumanize them. Everything will be done to wipe out their traditions, to substitute our language for theirs and to destroy their culture without giving them ours.

—Jean Paul Sartre, Preface to Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*

Will we recover? Yes, for violence, like Achilles’ lance, can heal the wounds that it has inflicted.

—Jean Paul Sartre, *Ibid.*

Tradition and Revolution

THE SOCIAL sciences depend upon “ideal types.” This concept, which lies at the center of Max Weber’s sociology, and was not unknown to Plato, provides simplified models of social reality for the theorist which sometimes permit a clearer view of facts under consideration. Traditional and modern, among others, are two of the most frequently used “ideal types.”

Weber writes more specifically of “traditional authority” that “legitimacy is claimed first and believed in on the basis of the sanctity of the order and the attendant forms of control as they have been handed down from the past, ‘have always existed.’”¹ The past, especially *continuity* with the past, is a critical part of the “traditional” model. Continuity in certain key institutions and certain vital principles is what anthropologists usually write of as “structure.” Absolute changelessness, impossible in any case, is not a necessary condition of a “traditional” model, but, at the same time, a model based on continuity with the past cannot accommodate fundamental

changes in the fabric of social life and upheavals in the key institutions and fundamental principles of organization. Such fundamental changes may be termed revolutions, and anthropologists in the Durkheimian tradition have been singularly shy of approaching the roots of these troublesome problems.

Weber did not specifically use the traditional-modern dichotomy implied by Eisenstadt in his essay in this volume. He had a more complex model with a range from "traditional" to "various forms of 'rational' (rather than 'modern') authority." Without going into the important problems of *Wertrational* and *Zweckrational*,² it may be observed that most writers have found the traditional-modern dichotomy a useful starting point. There is frequently little agreement on just what "modern" means, so that H. A. R. Gibb for instance, writes bluntly: "The plain truth of the matter is that 'modernization' means 'Westernization.'"³

In the hands of Eisenstadt, the ideal type "modern" seems to imply a successful society, rationally organized in the direction of sustained economic growth, and politically stable as well. There is little doubt that such a conception of "modern" is ethnocentric in that it represents a certain "materialist" stream in Western thought. Weber would probably have said that it left values (*Wertrational*) too much out of the picture and was not sufficiently attuned to the problems of the creation of a "good" or "just" society. He had recognized that behavior could be "rationally" directed towards the enhancement of certain primary values which could themselves be religious, or ethical, or even political without necessarily being directed towards "economic growth."

However, the world is getting smaller, and in the 1970's it seems clear that nations themselves are increasingly judging each other by the criteria of "economic growth." In this sense there are numerous societies which have cut their moorings with their traditional pasts and yet have been unable to start their economic engines. The concept of "post-traditional" draws attention to these drifting vessels. It also draws attention to the problem of a possible relationship (or the lack of it) between moorings and engines.

I am concerned in this paper with the cutting of the moorings in certain Islamic countries. It was indeed thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in these Islamic lands that there was some basic relationship between the "conservatism" and "fatalism" of Islam and the economic stagnation in Islamic lands. It was thought that Islam was a fundamental obstacle to "progress" and that the first task was to break the hold of Islam on the masses so that "progress" would almost automatically follow.

It is noteworthy that the issue was seen by "modern" intellectuals, particularly in Turkey, in these Comteian terms. As a matter of fact, one of the major political parties had adopted the Comteian title of "Union and

Progress" after the 1908 upheavals in the Ottoman Empire. The gradualist solution of Japan or India in which elements of tradition were interwoven into elements of political, social, and economic reforms was in Turkey, at a certain point, rejected. It had been tried for nearly 100 years in the Ottoman Empire (throughout the nineteenth century) but had been found wanting. In the 1920's and 1930's what would now be called a "cultural revolution" of unprecedented proportions was unleashed. This suggests only that there are no final arrivals in history, and that just as it is possible for India in the future to reject the gradualist solution in favor of more radical departures, it is also possible for Turkey to return to an attempt to re-establish contact with the broken ends of her own traditions. The task is to make the social roots of these extraordinary moves more intelligible in as systematic a manner as possible.

These various attempts at self-directed culture change are of great interest. The gradualist solutions are, perhaps, not so difficult to comprehend, but the radical attempts at social surgery, the intensity of ideological commitment to what must appear to be distant Utopian goals, the resulting cleavages in social life, the damage to hallowed institutions, the hatred and bitterness engendered even within families, and the specter of civil war waxing and waning, do merit the term "cultural revolution." In a perceptive paper on Turkey, Charles Gallagher writes:

The third type is the revolution which, although it may to some extent encompass features of the two preceding ones [i.e., "palace" and "colonial" revolutions], gushes forth with such energy from well springs of deep restlessness and discontent that it involves a retouching of cultural identity and a serious attempt to enter and participate in another civilization. . . . Historical changes engineer changes which may seem only technical at first, but which by the energy they unleash lead to a vast rearrangement of the most fundamental social values and reveal a will for a new social personality. Examples are few but pertinent, Japan, Turkey and possibly Communist China.⁴

These "cultural revolutions" present a fundamental challenge to contemporary, especially "structuralist," anthropology. What is the nature of this challenge?

"Structural Anthropology" and Revolution

Looking back to the period of the 1950's in anthropology, it is striking to see how much has changed. American anthropology was always a luxuriant growth, difficult to channel into neatly marked streams, but British anthropology was beginning to be formalized into fairly rigid categories. First there was the distinction between culture and social structure; then there was the classification of social structures, often in effect, based on the kinship model—patrilineal, matrilineal, bilateral, and so forth. Culture was treated as a residual category, and being messy, difficult to grasp, includ-

ing, in the words of Radcliffe-Brown, “books, works of art, knowledge, skill, ideas, beliefs, tastes, sentiments,” it was left to Americans. (Hence “cultural anthropology” and “social anthropology.”) There were many, of course, who suspected that to say that the Nayar of South India (Hindu) have the same matrilineal structure as the Minankabau of Sumatra (Muslim), or the matrilineal Bemba of Africa was not really significant; nor did the observation that the Nambudiri Brahmin of South India trace descent through the male line help the anthropologist to understand much (or indeed anything) about the Kurds of the Middle East who also had patrilineal ideas. The “structural tool” was too blunt an instrument. In all of these cases, what was most interesting were all those features of these societies which made them most different.

Actually, the limits of “social structure” as a tool of analysis were most clear in connection with the confusing, unclear kinship systems of South-east Asia. These limits were also evident in that the whole spectrum of faith, belief, ideology, and mythology became difficult to manage.

It is at this point that Claude Lévi-Strauss opened Pandora’s box. It was a good moment. The party was getting dull. In the pell-mell rush to catch some of the exotic shapes that have emerged, anthropology has been left in sixes and sevens.

What did Lévi-Strauss say that was so peculiar? Anyone who reads the “Introduction” of *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* cannot but be impressed by the incisiveness of the logic which propelled the man. He says that kinship behavior in some of its most exotic manifestations depends upon systems of “rules”—but how do these rules arise? Where do they come from? I cannot go into the detailed answer, but it is in this roundabout manner that Lévi-Strauss succeeded in altering the deeply ingrained “behaviorist” bias in anthropology, and found his way back to a systematic study of “culture.”⁵

I recall his lectures on the “Structural Study of Myth” at Cambridge in 1954. These are now widely regarded as classics. At that time, there was almost complete incomprehension, and total rejection of what was regarded as a preposterous French attempt to be more subtle by half than anyone else.

Why was the attempt so preposterous? This was so because Lévi-Strauss seemed to claim that “structure” did not exist at the level of action and behavior, but at the level of “thought.” He seemed to argue that he could find “structures” in the mental processes of primitive peoples without being concerned with their “sociological” realities. He seemed to argue that the realm of mythology was worthy of investigation and attention *per se*, even if it did not relate too closely or immediately to social organization.

At a later date he was to speak more directly of this distinction between mental life and social organization.⁶ He then used Marxist term-

inology: superstructures and infrastructures. In Marxist terms, it is the infrastructure which has primacy and which, in a complex manner, “determines” the superstructure. Thus, religious belief and thought are merely a reflection of the structure of power and domination in society. Lévi-Strauss, however, has called himself a “transcendental” Marxist: a phrase which should be repeated with some caution in the land of Thoreau and Emerson. The intention at least is to suggest, first, that the Marxist distinction is useful, and second, that it is not simply a matter of one level “determining” the other, but of a complex feedback between infrastructure and superstructure. While Lévi-Strauss has expressed himself in this vein in some private letters, in his publications he appears to be less and less interested in infrastructures and more and more drawn towards the analysis of superstructures.⁷ Both *La Pensée Sauvage* and his tomes on the mythology of South America are mainly concerned with the “structure of customary thought.” The question he has posed is: what are the internal and categorical constraints which channel the mythology of these peoples into predictable combinations and permutations of recognizable forms? This categorical scheme is like a kitchen utensil which cuts potatoes and carrots into certain set shapes.

Note, however, that even though Lévi-Strauss is writing suggestively of thought, of ideas, of ideas governing action like formulas governing mechanical tools, he does not say much about social or cultural change. I find most of Lévi-Strauss’ writing on change to be various ways of evading certain key issues. The now notorious distinction between hot and cold societies is hardly a serious contribution to science, even though it shows Lévi-Strauss’ predilection for culinary metaphors. Other suggestions to be found in various parts of his writings hint at tensions between certain categories of kinsmen which are glossed over, or “mediated” by mythology. This is again suggestive of Marxist thoughts—“religion is the opium of the people”—but the examples are not particularly illuminating.

In a footnote of criticism on G. Balandier he has expressed himself more fully on the problem of change and has revealed himself as a dyed-in-the-wool cultural conservative:

Au début d’une récente étude, G. Balandier annonce avec fracas qu’il est grand temps, pour la science sociale, de “saisir la société dans sa vie même et dans son devenir.” Après quoi il décrit, de façon d’ailleurs très pertinente, des institutions dont le but est, selon ses propres termes, de “regrouper” des lignages menacés par la dispersion; de “corriger” leur émiettement; de “rappeler” leur solidarité, “d’établir” une communication avec les ancêtres, “d’empêcher que les membres disjoints du clan ne deviennent étrangers les uns aux autres,” de fournir “un instrument de protection contre les conflits,” de “contrôler” et de “maîtriser” les antagonismes et les renversements, au moyen d’un rituel “minutieusement réglé” qui est “un facteur de renforcement des structures sociales et politiques.” On sera facilement d’accord avec lui, tout en doutant qu’il le soit lui-même avec ses prémisses, pour reconnaître que des institutions, dont il avait commencé par

contester qu'elles fussent fondées sur des "rapports logiques" et des "structures fixées" (p. 23) démontrent en fait la "prévalence de la logique sociale traditionnelle" (p. 33) et que "le système classique révèle ainsi durant une longue période, une surprenante capacité 'assimilatrice'" (p. 34). Dans tout cela, il n'y a de "surprenant" que la surprise de l'auteur.⁸

This may be called the gyroscopic theory of culture. We are asked to recognize a built-in tendency, almost an aesthetic sense of balance, which keeps ordering and reordering society, bringing the ship back on course after a buffeting by the forces of nature or history.

It seems to me that the question of social and cultural change, and especially radical ideological change, is still a major challenge now that Lévi-Strauss has cleared away some of the debris. Lévi-Strauss' contribution is essentially a contribution to "continuity." It is, therefore, all the more important to understand the nature and forms of ideological discontinuity in society. Hence this paper on secularism in Islam, and hence the interest in the momentous changes taking place in the community of Islam around the world.

The subject of social and ideological change is a preeminently anthropological subject. It is also one in which anthropologists have revealed themselves to be ostriches with their heads in the sands. It is difficult to read many monographs on the Middle East without being struck by the isolation of the anthropologists from the main currents of the time. The same is true of our work on Ceylon: there is not a hint of the tornado of Ché Guevara'ism that hit the island in April, 1971 in any of the dozens of monographs and Ph.D. theses written on this island in recent years.⁹ Neither Malinowsky, nor Kroeber, nor Evans-Pritchard and Fortes, nor indeed the Wilsons, whose theoretical book *The Analysis of Social Change* was at one point much celebrated, had prepared us for the tidal wave of politics, anomie, revolution, and civil war which hit Asia and Africa so soon after the ebb of Imperial power.

The Decline of Islam

I turn now to discuss some of these momentous issues in the context of Islam.

M. Mahdi, in his remarkable study of Ibn Khaldun, observes that the picture of Islam in the fourteenth century is one of general decline and disintegration:

A few areas, notably South West Persia, Egypt and Muslim Spain were able to preserve some vestiges of what was once a dynamic expansive civilization. Western North Africa, where Ibn Khaldun grew up, was the worst part of the Islamic world. It presented a spectacle of chaos and desolation.¹⁰

With this background, it is not surprising that Ibn Khaldun should have been interested in the social reasons for the rise and fall of cultures. As is

well known, his ideas on the role of "prophets" heralds Weber's ideas of "charismatic" leaders.

Mahdi writes of the fourteenth century. By the nineteenth century, the Turkish poet Ziya Paşa was to draw a similar picture of the House of Islam in some famous passages. There are many Muslims now who would say that conditions are only marginally better (perhaps worse) in the Islamic world since the nineteenth century. And as far as chaos is concerned, it reigns supreme at the level of ideology. On the one hand, we have Muslim leaders in secular Turkey claiming that *riba*, the taking of fixed interest on loan capital, is against the Qur'an and a sin just like adultery and prostitution; on the other hand, we have religious men in Pakistan saying that to see a true Islamic state in operation, there is no point in searching around in ancient texts—all one has to do is to see China, not the China of Taiwan, but that of Chairman Mao Tse Tung. For, it is said, Islam in the last resort is the vehicle for the creation of a community of equals. There are other elements in this puzzle, too, such as Prof. Erbakan, the leader of a right-wing party in Turkey, who wants to replace the works of Émile Durkheim in the Turkish public schooling system with those of the famous mystic Al-Ghazzali (who died in 1111).¹¹ On the total confusion, all would agree. Aziz Ahmad writes of Pakistan, for instance: "The situation is confused because the Western intelligentsia is as ignorant of Islamic religion and history as the ulema and the conservatives are of the pressures, stresses and challenges of the modern . . . civilization."¹²

What remains remarkable is the continuing attachment of the masses to the symbols and rituals of Islam. At times this attachment takes the form of a yearning for the Sharia, the legal code according to the Qur'an. At other times, the yearning for Islam produces movements around charismatic leaders, Seykhs, who can create in a *tariqat* (brotherhood) a sense of belonging, an Islamic community, a sense of legitimacy of the spiritual order which may appear to be lacking in the outside world. These *tariqat* are very much part of the social scene, even in a supposedly alien and godless republic like Turkey. They represent small-scale attempts to reproduce a particular understanding of the Islamic community in microcosm. I will not deal with the brotherhoods here, but they appear to be active aboveground or underground from Bosnia to Indonesia.

The attachment to the Sharia as a symbol is often cited as an example of the force of conservatism in Islam. Here the problem is more difficult. Some European jurists see it as follows:

Traditional Islamic ideology requires the total submission of man, in every aspect of his life on earth, to the divine will of Allah. Every Muslim, therefore, in theory is bound by the comprehensive system of duties, covering all human acts and relationships which represents the dictates of the divine will and which is termed the Sharia. As a code of behaviour the Shariat has a much wider scope and purpose than a simple legal system in the Western sense of the term. Not only does it regulate in meticulous detail the ritual practices of the faith such

as prayer, fasting, alms and pilgrimage, but many of its precepts are also directed solely at the individual's conscience. . . . We are dealing with . . . a composite scheme of religious duties and morality, all of which is "law" in the Islamic sense and the ultimate purpose of which is to secure divine favour both in this world and in the hereafter.¹³

With thirteen centuries of accretions, elaborations, and adaptations from the Mongol Yasa Codes, with accommodations to local custom, such as the matrilineal codes of the Muslim Tamils in Ceylon and the Miangkabau of Sumatra, the actual application of these "traditional models" represents many complexities for the community.

Note also that there is no place for secularism in this traditional conception. The dictionary definition of "secularist" is: "One who . . . rejects every form of religious faith or worship, and undertakes to live accordingly; also one who believes that education and other civil matters should be without a religious element." "Secularity" is defined as the character of being non-religious or divorced from religion. "Laic" is defined as "pertaining to a layman or the laity; lay, secular." "Laicize" means "to secularize; to put under the direction of or open to, laymen."¹⁴ As Mahdi writes:

In Islam it is doctrinally essential that religion should not merely have an external concern with worldly affairs . . . or clearly distinguish between affairs of the Spirit and the affairs of the World. None of these would suffice. Religion itself must be politicized. This is the historical basis which led Muslim philosophers and Ibn Khaldun to reflect upon Islam and the Islamic community as a political regime.¹⁵

But there have been severe setbacks precisely in the day-to-day application of Islamic law. In much of the Middle East, the immediate background of the modern legal systems goes back to the nineteenth century Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire. These reforms started with the constitutional reforms of 1839, and developed further with a new commercial code in 1850, a penal code in 1858, a code of commercial procedure in 1861, and a code of maritime commerce in 1863 mostly based on French models. These codes involved a new system of courts, and by the end of the nineteenth century the Sharia courts had become essentially restricted to matters concerned with family law. A similar development appears to have taken place in Egypt. Under the Khedive Ismail, mixed courts were set up in 1875 and "native" courts in 1883. These applied civil and penal codes of French inspiration.

In India the situation was both simpler and more complex. After 1765, as the British progressively enlarged their jurisdiction, the Sharia law which they took over from the Moguls was gradually restricted in its application. By the middle of the nineteenth century, as Christians ruling over Muslims, they had also restricted the applications of the Sharia to family law.

This gradual restriction in the scope of Sharia law in the direction of

family law is significant. It suggests, first, that governments have found it increasingly difficult to handle the problems in accordance with the strict interpretation of "traditional" law and have had to find ways and means to new legislation; and second, that, notwithstanding the great changes which have come about in the public affairs of Muslim states, the field of the family has remained relatively traditional and therefore still within the possible jurisdiction of the Sharia. It is not my intention here to follow the changes in the sphere of the family law even though these too are extensive; the new code in Tunisia may be said to have opened the famous door of the *Ijdiat* (independent interpretation) once again, after the Turks had, so to speak, exploded a bomb in front of this mythical door with their new European-inspired legislation during the Turkish Revolution in the 1920's.

It is in the field of constitutional law that the major problems have arisen. Where is the fountain of legitimacy in a Muslim state? The Qur'an? Or the people? Who is the sovereign? The people, or God? And who is to interpret this sovereign? Legislative assemblies somehow elected? Or the Ulema who have traditionally interpreted the body of Islamic teachings?

An "Ideological" State

This question is of more than mere academic interest. It has kept more than 100 million people in constant agitation in Pakistan ever since the separation from India. The tragic story of Bengla Desh is only a new twist in the desperate struggle of Islam in politics. The dimensions of the problem go far beyond the limits of Pakistan. It comes up insistently in Turkey, together with paranoic fears of what would happen if the Islamists, so-called, were to grab power. There are, perhaps, four political parties in the Islamic corner of the political spectrum who claim that they would like to create an Islamic state in Turkey. With all their sincerity, it is perhaps good that they do not know much about the ideological impasses of Pakistan.

An important Pakistani scholar¹⁶ has written that Pakistan is an "ideological state." This means that Pakistan is to be governed by the goals and values laid down by Islam. "This . . . implies that Pakistan has these principles, policies, and program goals fully worked out on Islamic grounds which (will be implemented and embodied in a Constitution) just as various Communist parties, for example, have their goals and policies worked out in Communist terms—since Communist ideology too is total and not partial—so have the Pakistani Muslims worked out Islam."¹⁷

Rahman suggests that, in actual fact, Islamic imperatives are far from well-known and already agreed upon, and that it is not merely a matter of these imperatives being implemented, but also a question of discovery and agreement—which is another matter altogether. He continues: "When . . . we turn to the two Constitutions actually enacted [and abrogated] we are

surprised to find that none of the things mentioned [above—viz. that Islam is well known and the imperatives worked out—none of this] is true; on the contrary, it is startling to find a) that Islam appears in these constitutions an item among a host of other matters . . . and b) that where Islam does appear it appears essentially *as a limitation*, as a “bounding” or limiting concept rather than as a positive or creative factor whence positive results are derived as values, goals or programs for human progress and enrichment.” There are even stronger indictments bringing these endeavors of Pakistan into the target area of the Turkish “secularists,” as we shall see.

Rahman writes: “The statements about the Islamicization of Law, particularly in the 1956 Constitution (clause 198.3), also strongly suggest that ‘Islamicization’ means bringing the existing law into conformity with *something that existed in the past*. In view of the fact that Islam is not yet ‘there’ in Pakistan, some . . . have suggested that Pakistan be designated only as a ‘Muslim [not Islamic] Republic,’ for the time being just as Communist states call themselves ‘Socialist [not Communist] states.’ The fundamental difference between the two . . . is that whereas Communism is *future-oriented*, Islam [as envisioned in Pakistan] is essentially *past-oriented*.”¹⁸

These are very serious observations regarding the nature of “Models.” They must be seen in the context of the creation of Pakistan out of heterogeneous Muslim groups in the Indian subcontinent. Their common identity was forged both in the struggle against the Hindus and against the British, the very powers which demolished the Mogul Empire; these facts of history form important strands in the identity of Muslims in India.

The very identity of the new state was thus fed by deeply conservative groups who had preserved Islam in the days of its subjugation. The anti-British Ulema who maintained their conservative stand in the Deoband seminary, as one organized group, were both in close touch with the Muslim masses and mindful that the traditions had to be safe-guarded and maintained uncontaminated by Europeans. Together with this severely conservative reaction of certain groups, this instinctive withdrawal and turning inwards like a threatened porcupine—an attitude repeated in the deep conservatism of many Islamic communities in their relation with Europeans from Kazan in Russia to Morocco in Africa—there was in Pakistan the political problem of how to bring together diverse Muslim groups who represented many facets of the thousands of caste and language categories of India. In this respect, the political expediency of the strong protestations of Islam is transparent. It was only Islam which held together Punjabi, Sindi, Baluchi, Pathan, Bengali, Bihari, and many others, not to mention the castes. It remained the only principle whereby West Pakistan maintained its military hold on East Bengal. It is said by certain intellectuals of Pakistan that Turkey and Egypt, with their firmly based national identities, can well afford to become “secular,” but that “secularism” in Pakistan—interpreted as the abandonment of the attempt to set up an Islamic state

based on an Islamic constitution—would mean the dissolution of the entity called Pakistan. The idea of a nation here is still in the process of being hammered out.

We may observe in this highly instructive case an attempt to return to the sacred mainspring of the culture in order to imbibe its strength and to reestablish a nation on the basis of an ancient and hallowed model. It is a typical case of emergence from the colonial twilight. The issue is the re-establishment of an identity—a Muslim identity. It will be readily observed that in such precarious conditions there can be no thought of a rechanneling of the cultural mainstreams of Islam. No attempt can be made to effect fundamental alterations in the sense of identity of the culture. Radical departures may, of course, still be in store for the future.¹⁹

An Anti-Scientific Ideology

If the colonial experience strengthened the desire to hold fast to symbols and principles of distinctive identity, how have the forgotten Muslims of the Soviet Union fared? Has Communism proved to be the solvent to melt the sense of distinctive identity? How has a universalist religion like Islam fared in its immersion into the universalist sea of Communism? We cannot go into more than a hint of the extraordinary issues here. Alexandre Bennigsen and Lemercier-Qulquejay end their brilliant study with, “there can be no doubt that the long period of isolation experienced by Soviet Islam from 1920 to 1960 is nearing its end. Is it probable that the years ahead will put the Muslims of the Soviet Union in the forefront of events? Formerly a mere cog in the internal development of the USSR, they are now in a fair way to becoming one of the major subjects of world policy.”²⁰

It is now estimated that there are about 40 million Muslims, 75 per cent Turkic speakers, in the Soviet Union. Islam has been under constant attack since the establishment of Russian rule over the Muslims. The Czarist period is characterized by missionary attacks on Islam which, with the Communist revolution, give way with certain noteworthy periods of respite to Communist attacks. “. . . All Soviet theoreticians insist that the campaign against the Muslim religion must continue,” since “the attitude of the [Clergy] is one thing, and the essence of religion, which has been and always will be anti-scientific and profoundly inimical to Marxist-Leninist ideology, is another.”

“Islam for the Marxist is ‘the opium of the people,’ a reactionary and anti-scientific ideology giving a fanciful and fallacious notion of society.” At times these theoreticians wax almost poetic: Islam is a “primitive and fantastic religion,” “a chaotic mixture of Christian, Jewish and pagan doctrines” founded “by a member of the feudal trading classes of Mecca with the object of providing a religious pretext for the plundering expeditions organized by the Arab aristocracy.” In its social and cultural aspect Islam is

"one of the most reactionary religions in the world"; "it has impeded all reform and has retarded the evolution of Turkestan" by preaching "the unconditional submission of the believer to fate and to his oppressors."²¹ The Qur'an is a code of "injustice and inequality," and the Sharia is "a collection of laws among the most unjust which the world has ever seen."

This obviously rich vein of polemic has also been used by Chinese communists in Tibet by arguing that the Buddha, too, was a mere thief and a plunderer, lower even than a reactionary chauvinist nationalist.²²

What is fascinating in the Communist attack is that it is meticulously organized for culture change. The party, the regional branches of the Marx-Engels, Lenin Institute, and the Ministries of Culture are involved. There is also now "The Association for the Spread of Political and Scientific Knowledge" which has taken over the tasks of the pre-war "Union of Godless Zealots." Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejay provide marvelous figures: the Kazakh branch, with 15 regional and 209 urban sections, had under its control 815 propaganda bureaus. It organized in the space of three years, 30,528 public lectures of which 23,000 were devoted to anti-religious subjects. In Uzbekistan, the Association held more than 10,000 anti-religious lectures in 1951. In Turkmenistan, in 1963, the same Association held 5,000 anti-Islamic lectures. On top of this, it is coyly added, "anti-religious propagandists try to reach believers in their homes, where they oblige them to engage in private conversations." These efforts are apparently considered insufficient by the Soviet authorities. There appears to be much complaint that religious superstitions and even *tarikats* are of increasing importance.

The surface manifestations of Islam are subdued. In 1913 it was estimated that Russian Islam was served by 26,279 mosques, excluding Bukhara and Khiva. By 1942 these were reduced to 1,312 according to official bulletins. By 1964 it was reported that the number in Central Asia and Kazakhstan had fallen to about 250. The numbers for the clergy are 45,339 without Bukhara and Khiva before the Revolution in 1917. Bertold Spuler calculates their number for 1955 to be 8,052, which recent writers think has been further reduced.

Even so, G. E. Wheeler writes that, with all the disappearance of the outward manifestations, "it may be doubted . . . whether Islam is any less ingrained in the hearts and minds of the Muslims of Central Asia than it is elsewhere, for example, in Turkey and Persia."²³ Russian ethnographers at least do not fail to detect the tell-tale signs: 100 per cent observance of the rites of circumcision, for instance, or the absence of a single case of intermarriage between Russians and Muslims in the city of Ashkabad in the last 50 years, and other similar hints.

Models of the Past and Future

Here again we have an extraordinary example of induced culture

change. We have the cadres and the doctrines of the new order which are forced, regimented, and rammed down the throats of the ignorant proletariat by their enlightened leaders, yet there are at least questions and doubts as to the direction of where this particularly interesting example of culture change is in fact heading.

The fervent ideals of Pakistan on the one hand, and scientific strivings of Marxist-Leninist cadres (Godless Zealots or not) on the other, set the wings of the stage in which contemporary Islam exists. Culture change does not come alone; it comes in the context of politics. Power relations are of the essence. It comes with organized groups, cadres, systems of education, internal dissension, and, probably, with the unpredictable appearance of creative and gifted men who can wrap the mantle of charisma, already prepared and ready to be offered by an expectant community, around themselves. In more mundane language, this is the "personality cult"; Ibn Khaldun spoke of them as "prophets." Arthur Koestler, Aldous Huxley, George Orwell (1984 is almost upon us) had, of course, fully warned us of this form of "culture change," the kind that involves organized attempts at "double-talk" and "double-think," but it is obvious that as anthropologists we had not taken them sufficiently seriously.

The fact remains that the two major models of culture, one oriented to the past, and the other oriented to the future, exert subtle influences on the body politic: the "past" and Islam are inevitably conservative and the "future" and Communism open a path to self-righteous radicalism.

Disillusion with the Past

The situation in Turkey has elements of both the Soviet picture and that of Pakistan, yet it is unlike either in one crucial respect. In the above cases, we have the fact of colonial domination (for that is certainly what the Soviet case is, though the conspiracy of silence regarding Central Asia is almost eerie) and its attendant repercussions: the conservative reaction, the symptoms of withdrawal, the anxious protection of cultural identity, the surrounding of the community with a wall of aggression. The colonial aspect is weak in Turkey. To be sure, the Ottoman Empire was dismembered at the end of World War I, but the immediate experience of direct foreign domination was a brief one, restricted to the so-called Armistice at the end of World War I. This lack of domination, which, however, went hand in hand with an inability to dominate the European powers, had had a devastating and debilitating effect on Ottoman institutions.

In the frenetic self-examination to find and arrest the reasons for the continuing weakness of the Ottoman Empire, generations of intellectuals subjected their own institutions to the most devastating self-criticism. Reforms were undertaken by the Ottoman administration—often in the teeth of popular discontent—to alter the institutions of the Empire and bring them into line with European models. The reforms generated reactions, up-

risings, downfalls of Sultans, or Grand Viziers, and much rolling of heads. Much of the Ottoman history of the nineteenth century is recounted in Turkish historiography as a progressive, contrapuntal development towards modern, I should say “Western,” institutions. Moreover, the contrapuntal movement is seen to be generated by champions of reform and reaction who are placed on an equal horizontal footing. Prof. Tunaya’s writing, for instance, is characteristic.²⁴ He discusses intellectual men on both sides of the Reformist-Reactionist divide. (The same division is also spoken of as the Secularist [Modernist] as opposed to the Islamicist groups.) In my opinion, the presentation of this issue as a simple *Kulturkampf* obscures the vital sociological dimension of these movements. In this model of reform and reaction there is also a vertical, hierarchical, social class dimension. The Ottoman reformists were almost invariably members of the elite, often in the Civil Service, generally well educated, and in some respect at least, men who had experienced some form of the domination of the Europeans over the Empire. The reaction, on the other hand, had deeper roots. It was said to draw support from the general, relatively ignorant, rather conservative masses. In this sense, then, the reforms undertaken by the members of the elite ruling institutions were rather like a sonar, a depth sounder, on a boat: they would send shock waves down into the masses, and would listen to the echo. Depending on the kind of shock the masses received, the echo would also be appropriately stunning.

At some point these Ottoman intellectual reformers got the idea that if they did not have to contend with these reactions, especially the reactions based on religious grounds, on some infringement of the Sharia rules, they would be more effective. It is at this time that they discovered the “scientific” attitude toward religion. Some simply state this bluntly: “Quand les peuples ont atteint un certain degré de culture se débarrassent naturellement de la religion”—a chance remark by an Ottoman in a preface to a book entitled *L’Effort Ottoman* (Paris, 1907). We need hardly go back to Proudhon and Comte for the paternity of these ideas.²⁵ Scientific non-religion fitted the intentions of these reformers. Some were obviously so dissatisfied with Ottoman institutions that they were ready to throw them over for something new. These reformist ideas could not be stated very openly in the Ottoman parliament. Riza Nur, in his recently discovered—and already banned—memoirs, describes how certain hints in Parliament by the philosopher Riza Tevfik, that the Ottomans had a history before they became Muslims, and that the Turks were probably Maenickian and Buddhist at some time in their history, are shouted down as he is made to beat a hasty retreat with his life in some danger.²⁶ However, Riza Nur, member of the Ottoman Parliament, later member of the Nationalist Parliament in Ankara, Delegate of Mustafa Kemal to Moscow and the second ranking delegate at the peace negotiations at Lausanne with Inonu, is himself a man of particular interest. His memoirs are now regarded by Conservatives as the ideological

answer to the sweeping secularist reforms of Mustafa Kemal; he is seen as the spokesman of the conservative Turanists and Islamicists in Turkey, and yet he tells us in these embarrassingly candid memoirs that he is a man without religion. It is a noteworthy situation indeed when the defense of religion falls upon men who are themselves godless.²⁷

This is not the place to go into the detailed examination of the Secularist reforms that were undertaken in Turkey by the new republic. They are familiar and have received exhaustive attention.²⁸ They sweep away the *ancien régime*. The Ottoman Sultanate is of course abolished. The "culture" associated with the old regime is brought under a devastating attack. The symbolism that is selected is important. The headgear, the red Moroccan fez, which was a distinctive mark of the nineteenth century Ottomans is abolished. Hats with brims are instituted in place of the fez: the brim would not permit the forehead to touch the ground if any believer could keep his trilby on while praying in the mosques. The veiling of women is forbidden by decree. All religious orders, schools, and *tariqat* are disbanded and abolished as mere receptacles of superstition and inequity. Later, the offices of the Caliph and Seyh-ul Islam, the highest religious offices, are dispensed with. Religious endowments are taken over by the State. Instead of these positions a General Directorate of Religious Affairs is established under the Prime Ministry with firm control over all *sunni* religious activities. Even more indicative of the Reformers' far-reaching cultural intentions, is the abolition of the Ottoman Arabic script and the adoption of the Latin alphabet. The Islamic calendar is abolished. The call to prayer is changed from its Arabic form to a Turkish form. And without fussing with the intricate problems of the Sharia, the Italian penal code, the Swiss civil code, and the German commercial codes are adopted.

It is all indeed a remarkable affair. Those who are more fortunate and look upon a continuity of tradition and an orderly—or even disorderly—development of institutions can hardly appreciate the degree of hostility shown towards the ideas and forms of the traditional past. The experience is not a conversion, perhaps (for there was no turning to Christianity), but an anti-conversion, a turning away from the Islamic tradition, without having anything very clear—at first—to turn towards. The point was made by Gökalp that a conversion to Western civilization was needed and this, to be precise, meant Rationality and Secularism. I will return to this, but will note in passing, how different this is, for instance, from the stance of the Sinhalese in Ceylon, who, upon receiving their independence from Britain, have been trying valiantly to reestablish the Buddhist religion, turning away from the Latin script and the use of English to rediscover the glories of the ancient Sinhalese script and literature. They have now instituted the ancient Buddhist calendar with its Moon days (instead of Sundays) and its weeks of uncertain duration. The thoroughness of the Turkish house-cleaning is not even matched by the Russian or Chinese Revolu-

tions. They have their similarities, but at least neither of them tampered with the scripts of these peoples and, therefore, have allowed the new generation some access to their traditional history. In Turkey, the new Latin script has made it very difficult for the new generations to go back even to the newspapers of 1920, let alone to the nineteenth century.²⁹

Taken as a whole, the intention of the Turkish Reforms is clearly to deal a mortal blow to an entire culture and to set up a new culture, with new men. Hence all the talk of the creation of a new Kemalist youth uncontaminated by the hopes and aspirations of a past that was regarded as backward, corrupt, rotten, weak, and shameful. And since Islam was at the heart of the *ancien régime*, it is Islam that receives the heaviest blow. There is a special chamber of the Topkapi Palace which houses the sacred memorabilia of the Prophet himself, which the Ottoman Sultans had brought to Istanbul from the holy cities of the Hijaz. In this holy place relays of "readers" had recited the words of the Qur'an for four hundred years without a break until the abolition of the Caliphate in 1922. They were apparently hustled out unceremoniously one morning on orders from Ankara. There was, it seems clear, a firm effort made to stop the main current of Islam from flowing into the minds of the new generations. To some extent this has been successful, but with unexpected results.

Illusions for the Future

I call the sum of these efforts, with the obvious analogy, the Cultural Revolution, since it seems to me there is a similarity of intention with China. In both cases we have countries with vivid ideas of grandeur who have been disappointed by their own past performances. In both cases the need is felt by those in power to go beyond mere corrections and adjustments in the culture which maintains their institutions. The intention is to raze the old decrepit house and to reharvest popular energies for the creation of something new. Some optimistic and satisfying Utopian vision of the future is needed. This vision is the creation of a new culture, a new state, and a new future.

There are not many of these cases. Those that are available are highly instructive from the point of view of Western social science. The change in ideology, the new thoughts in the minds of new men, play a central part in the total change that is brought about. The reasons why such ideas arise, the nature of the soil which proves fertile to these seeds, repays analysis. Hence my excuse for returning to these issues.

What we have here is first a sense of disillusion, a feeling that old forms will not do, that the old faith is not enough, that new forms are needed. This sense of negation seems to go hand in hand with internal dissension, division, and a breakdown of social order. I suspect that this degree of disenchantment arises from a certain dissonance between what is expected

in the world and what actually exists. In many countries the loss of power, of empire, of dominance, and of grandeur gave rise to deeply disappointed and gloomy appraisals of self-worth. In a minor way, France in 1958 went through such an experience.³⁰

In Turkey, the total dislocation of World War I, the loss of province after province, and foreign occupation prepared the ground by fragmenting and shattering old social frameworks and especially the political institutions. New hope could only be injected into this context by the promise of grandeur and the restoration of pride in the future. The "model" of the future could not be Islamic. Nationalists had just been fighting the so-called Army of the Caliphate. It had to be "modern," Western, Nationalist.

It seems to me that it is in such times of great confusion, the dark and dangerous times of interregnum, that new models for society, new forms for ideals, and ideas for a new life are hammered out and propagated. It is also then that the internal social cleavages and dissensions become critical, because it is these internal frontiers which then become the frontiers of new ideas.

We do not know exactly around what ideological poles the resistance to Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution in China is likely to develop. We know that the old bureaucracy has been identified as the recalcitrant villain. Chou En-Lai indicates that "the revolution" has not attained its goals (the transformation of China) and that it must be "carried on continuously."³¹

In Turkey, for special reasons, whenever Mustafa Kemal made efforts to establish a "loyal" opposition, it was the problem of Islam which kept returning to haunt the reformers. As the recollection of the Ottoman experience faded, the return of Islamic forms to the political arena in some form became a yearning difficult to resist. Unlike Russia, and unlike China or Mexico, Turkey held free elections in 1950. These elections, contested by men who formed a splinter group from within the ruling single party, resulted in the loss of power of the Reformist (CHP) party after a rule of almost 30 years. With all the great fears that a super-conservative Islamic party would reimpose the Sharia—however interpreted—in fact some kind of *modus vivendi* was reached which allowed free party politics to proceed in Turkey for awhile in a fashion entirely unexpected. After the extraordinary reforms, an extraordinary reaction could have been expected. That is indeed what the leadership of the Soviet Union and even of China, perhaps, would have to fear if ever there is a transition to open politics in these states.

The politics of Turkey gave the impression to the unsatisfied reformists on the left, who felt that "liberty" had been restored far too early, that the great reformist task had been left incomplete just as in China. It was felt that a new wave of reform must be instituted since the condition of the Turkish Republic was far from satisfactory. At the same time, with the restoration of liberty the Islamicists, so long under pressure, began to show

their hand, at first rather tentatively, then more strongly, and lately (1971) forcefully enough to engender certain fears that an Indonesian style of uprising was being planned by the Islamic conservatives. In Indonesia in a frightening uprising many Communists were killed in a very brief span of days, and, as is well known, the regime lurched away from Socialism.

These two extreme wings, the yearning for the political restoration of Islam as in Pakistan on the one hand, and the yearning for Marxist-Leninist scientific rationality on the other, characterize the parameters within which the Turkish Republic is placed at this time. It is as if the battles of nineteenth century Europe—socialism against the traditional order—are now being fought on the home ground of Islam in Turkey. Rumbles of such struggles are heard in other Islamic countries, too. Their outcome may be civil war in some cases, domination by one side or the other in others; it seems too much to expect scholars to provide the ideas for a reconciliation between these implacable wings.

The Seeds of Civil Strife

We do not know whether a reconciliation is even possible in the Turkish case. Many elements of moderation are present, it is true, but the attempt to keep the central arena open and to allow the two massive popular parties, at the present at least, to get on with the task of government has placed the two extreme wings under the shadows. The extreme wings, the secret Islamic organizations directly or indirectly supported by large masses and a well-organized Communist underground movement, have evidently developed activist cells especially among the 100,000 University students. The elaborate network of secret leftist organizations apparently links up with the outlawed TKP (Turkish Communist Party) and some have called themselves the TKO (Turkish Liberation Army). Again, there is certainly an international aspect to these organizations so that the money from oil in the Middle East, from various Communist and other parties, and from a host of other sources, it is said, flows quite freely. The talk makes it appear as if the "Union of Godless Zealots" in the Soviet Union is pitted against the Jamaat-i Islami in Pakistan, but major world alignments are also at stake.

Every now and then an incident takes place which, like a flare, suddenly illuminates the major preoccupations of a society and brings troublesome issues to the surface. An incident of this kind, full of emotional overtones, took place two years ago in Turkey. One of the senior judges of the Supreme Court died. It was said of him that he was a self-admitted agnostic, if not an atheist. Certainly he had always shown himself to be hostile to the popular party then in power (AP), the party which if not openly Islamicist—for that is difficult in Turkey—had at least given the appearance of being sympathetic to Islam and had often received, alone, about 50 per cent of the popular vote.³² Upon the death of this man, Öktem, the political tension

in the entire country began to rise. It was said that mosque officials would refuse to perform the Islamic prayers and simple rituals at his funeral ceremony because an atheist such as Öktem could not be given an Islamic funeral. The funeral, a state occasion on account of the seniority of the judge, had brought together members of the top echelon of the political institutions of the Republic. Apparently, there was indeed some refusal to perform the traditional prayers, then much excitement, and when the aged leader of the Secularist and Kemalist opposition party (the CHP), İnönü, appeared on the scene to pay his respects he was caught in immense crowds. Thereupon, significantly enough, an officer, indeed a general, drew his revolver, pushed the crowd aside, and it is said "saved" İnönü from the crowd. The next day, İnönü announced that "Backwardism had risen from the grave (İrtica hortluyor), that the cultural reforms were in danger." The tension continued and in an amazing development the entire senior judiciary of the republic demonstrated in the streets in a silent march against the "Backwardism" that had risen from the grave. All these activities were, of course, directed squarely against the popular (AP) party in power and its leadership. They did, in fact, culminate on March 12, 1971 in a declaration by the commanders of the military establishment that the AP Prime Minister Demirel must resign. This he did and thereby averted, no doubt, the kind of *coup d'état* that had taken place against Prime Minister Menderes, leader of the same populist groups in May, 1960.

The forces that were aligned in the 1960 *coup* and the 1971 *annunciamiento* are not quite the same. There has been a massive growth of left-wing organizations in the ten years between 1960 and 1971, but the Öktem incident does express with particular clarity the surface organizations which are ranged in flanks, though one can only guess at the secret organizations behind them, in the shadows. On the surface, at least, there is the Senior Civil Service and the administrative elite which we may re-identify as the ruling institution of Ottoman days ranged against the ordinary and nameless masses, probably sympathizers of the right-wing parties, and especially the mass party in power at the time (AP).

Metin Toker, the son-in-law of İnönü, brings this out with special clarity in his recent writing. He quotes the left ideologues as follows:

That Kemalism is not the ideology of the Petit Bourgeois but of the real Bourgeois is now better understood. In fact Kemalism is the name taken over by Turkish Nationalism, and it has got this name from its founder. . . . Nationalism is an ideology appropriate to the Capitalist period. . . . And Kemalism was the name of the ideology of the nation, of nationalism, current after the 1920's. The period of the War of Independence must be separated from the period of the Kemalist reforms at a later date. The reforms carried out at that date were certain actions carried out for the benefit of a bourgeois order. To bring the nation up to the level of the civilization of the day was the expression of the desire to reproduce a typical Western bourgeois nation. This is why the working class cannot make a common cause with Kemalist ideology. It cannot make a common cause with those who strangled, jailed, dominated the left.³³

Toker then hopefully adds:

Those Kemalist civilian and military intellectual “enlightened ones,” who shouted “the second war of liberation” in the streets, who distributed pamphlets without being aware of these realities and the sharp thinking on the Leftist Front are now probably a little ashamed of themselves.

Perhaps. I have said that the Kemalist reforms are felt to be an incomplete piece of work by the intellectuals of the Turkish left. Many now write that those reforms did not go much further than aping the West:

I do not believe that most Turkish intellectuals with all their good will will be helpful to socialism. For 200 years the Turkish intellectual has Aped the West; imitated the West. An Ape is not creative. It may look human but it is not creative. Since Turkish bourgeois intellectuals have aped the West for 200 years, they have not made any contribution to Humanity for 200 years. . . . Now after 200 years, when we say let us turn to our Identity, let us set up our own socialism, real socialism, then they turn against us, and start looking for models. . . . They look for the model of the Soviet Union, or the model of China. The entire struggle of Lenin has been to create his own model.³⁴

Here, then, the story comes full circle, for Mehmet Akif, the Islamicist, had also written of the earliest reforms:

People of a nation whose religion is imitation, whose world is imitation, whose customs are imitation, whose dress is imitation, whose greetings and language is imitation, in short, whose everything is imitation are clearly themselves mere imitation human beings, and can on no account make up a social group and hence can not survive.³⁵

Recent days have seen a rapprochement between the Moderates at the Center with the Activist radicals in the wings, but the seeds of civil war are well sown. Communism and Islam with their armed and well-heeled fanatic adherents are now pitted against each other, and the avoidance of civil war depends upon the ability to compromise of the political leaders at the Center. I say nothing about the Army here though I have written about this elsewhere, for the Army, too, neutral until recently, is being increasingly drawn into the irresistible polarization.

Is this going to be the fate of Islam elsewhere? One hopes not. At the same time, one cannot overlook Bernard Lewis’ sobering assessment:

from time to time in recent years Middle Eastern thinkers have put the question: what is the result of all the Westernization? It is a question which we of the West may well ask ourselves too. It is our complacent habit in the Western world—the more so the further west one goes—to make ourselves the model of virtue and progress. To be like us is to be good; to be unlike us is to be bad. To become more like us is to improve; to become less like us is to deteriorate. It is not necessarily so. When civilizations clash, there is one that prevails, and one that is shattered. Idealists and ideologues may talk glibly of a “marriage of the best elements” from both sides, but the usual result of such an encounter is a cohabitation of the worst.³⁶

Conclusion

I want to conclude with three theoretical observations: on the nature of cultural revolution and secularism, on the interaction of models as a theory of social change, and on charisma and culture change as a cyclical long-term process.

Gallagher, in his paper on Turkey quoted above,³⁷ distinguishes between three types of revolutions in the contemporary scene: palace revolutions, colonial revolutions, and cultural revolutions. The first he regards a mere change of personnel without altering the institutions. The second, colonial revolution, is described as the Nationalist reaction to the outside power which brings about an apologetic clinging to the past glories of the indigenous traditions. In India, for instance, there is the resurgence of Indian traditions, Indian dress, and Indian ritual developed in conscious and studied contrast to Western models. This process of self-discovery can be seen in the autobiographies of men such as Gandhi or Nehru. In Ceylon, there is a fascinating rediscovery and resurgence of Buddhism by Dharma-pala, among others, with assistance of Col. H. S. Olcott and Madame Blavatsky, superbly described by H. Bechert.³⁸

We have been concerned with the third type, the "cultural" revolution in which social institutions are pulled out from their very roots, and new values, new ideas, new blueprints are inculcated in new men. Gallagher speaks of this as an attempt made to enter and participate in another civilization, ideas which are echoed in the very words of the public prosecutor of Izmir, Turkey, who spoke recently at one of the common trials of a religious fundamentalist group. After accusing them of various cultural-political crimes, of trying to undermine the "secular" order of the republic, he said: "This case which in a sense involves the history of the Turkish Nation, its regime, its very existence and its future, is of extreme importance. At the same time this is a trial for progress [literally, 'age'] and civilization." He goes on to claim that these people—who include lawyers and other professional men in their ranks—are ignorant persons who "do not understand the value of Reason and Science."³⁹

Certainly the literature on the attitude of Chinese intellectuals to their own traditions and religious forms seems remarkably familiar. C. K. Yang reports the same despair about tradition in the 1920's in China and the same view that "religion is a relic of man's primitive ignorance."⁴⁰ They, too, appear to formulate the contest between "objective science," a stage before one reaches scientific-historical-materialism, and "blind tradition." The writing of the Chinese on their Cultural Revolution, from the need for reform in the Opera and the Arts to the Red Guards, seems completely familiar from the perspective of Turkey. Here is a common experience.⁴¹

Maurice Freedman, in his Presidential Address to the Royal Anthropological Institute in London, observes: "What was intended was a further

stage in the total transformation of social and cultural life . . . by a campaign directed against the remnants of 'bourgeois' and 'feudal' mentality and behaviour—the Four Olds . . . old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits.”⁴² It is these that had to go.

Freedman appears surprised and even annoyed in this lecture that these transformations should bring about such a religious fervor, such blind fury, and unleash such aggressive energies against the remaining bastions of resistance detected by fanatic hordes to be the prime targets. But, then, we are always in danger of overlooking the intensity of the affect that has been routinized and runs under the surface, as it were, of our most ordinary, even unconscious social arrangements. The intensity of this affect comes through to consciousness only when our pet customs and habits and ideas and institutions are seriously challenged. How natural it is for blind fury to sweep the land while these institutions of a despised order which have already been desecrated are being demolished. It is true that the protagonists and the antagonists of different ideologies for the future of the nation then begin to behave as if possessed by demons. But then again, without this kind of almost religious and unquestioning commitment to such ideals, how could they be realized? New forms can only be imprinted on a community after desperate struggles. It calls for commitment and sacrifice which, depending upon the centrality of the institution, may require bloodshed. New men who are already converted to the new order have to be put in charge. Others who cannot mend their ways or see the light have to be eliminated. The demons cannot rest until the new order is felt to be safe from attack—which, of course, it may never be. And the greater and more total the transformation, the greater the passions and the more bitter the sacrifices. Such passions subside only when the new molds into which social action is directed and the new personality which has been created are seen to be satisfactory in day-to-day operations. Then with time and the healing of wounds one may get back to ordinary living. It is clearly not an experience willingly to be wished upon one's friends. The attempt to inculcate the personal qualities of such blind obedience to duty and such commitment to utopian ideals, to allow men to suppress questioning doubts, to stifle the temptations towards individual rationality, and to accept the commands of the “Party” is indeed a striking theme of early Communist writers. Sartre writes of this in his famous play, *Les Mains Sales*, and Arthur Koestler has vividly described the internal debate of the convert.

The struggle to transform a society, to effect a cultural revolution must at the same time be a significant political act. Such acts demand those special qualities of leadership, of vision, of direction and charisma, of rationality perhaps, but also those tenacious aspects of fanaticism and self-confidence which run below the surface and without which men such as Mustafa Kemal and Mao Tse-tung would not have accomplished much. Once power

is firmly established, however, the reins are in hand and the passions rechanneled into more mundane problems; then with patience and with care new institutions may be constructed, new habits and ideals may be carefully cultivated. Lévi-Strauss is right in calling affectivity the "darkest side of man." These questions concerning the release, the direction, the control, and the channeling of affectivity in terms of old and new cultural forms in whole societies is an area which would repay careful anthropological observation.

The Chinese Revolution is indeed remarkable. No country had disintegrated so tragically as a result of the combination of the colonial touch of death and internal dissension. The period of the fall of the Manchu dynasty, the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's, is one of almost unrelieved horror and confusion for China. There were experiments with alternative models from the West, with Christianity and capitalism, but in a strictly understandable sense, the ideology that took root was one which was neutral in religious coloring and which presented itself (despite itself, for the Russians assisted Chiang Kai Chek) as an ideology of the oppressed against the "long noses."⁴³ Then Mao created his cadres for the propagation of Mao'ism just as Mustafa Kemal had created his cadres for the propagation of Kemalism. Mao's cadres, though more internationally-minded than Kemalists who are more strictly Nationalist, and in a sense old-fashioned by contrast, attacked the traditional bastions just as assiduously as did the Kemalists. Reading the passages of the material from the Great Cultural Revolution, one gets a strong flavor of the Turkish utopian zeal. The sudden imperious demands by the colorful Japanese novelist Yukio Mishima and his stunning act of traditional serial *hara-kiri* suggest a similar struggle going on beneath the surface between two civilizations, even in a Japan suffused with economic success—but this case is not, strictly speaking, comparable with the problems of China and Turkey. In any case, Mishima looks to the past of Japan.

The differences between the revolutions of China and Turkey should also be noted. The Chinese case, fought bitterly for almost thirty years among a host of warlords, invading armies, and warring factions in the twilight of World War II, involved an extensive social revolution as well. As is well known, entire classes were eliminated. An extraordinary and thorough land reform is said to have completely transformed the social structure of the rural countryside. There is little doubt that in Turkey there was no social revolution in this sense. The attempts at land reform were not very extensive. The effort made to eliminate certain commercial groups towards the end of World War II now remains merely a bad memory. In this sense, the social classes in the republic have simply evolved from former groups in the Empire. The Ruling Institutions are still ruling. Some left-wing intellectuals would say that the so-called "bureaucratic intelligentsia" is under attack from the mass parties of the AP (formerly

DP—Democratic Party) type, but, as was observed above, the army-civil service-universities coalition still manages to have the upper hand, even in the teeth of free elections, as the events of March 12, 1971 demonstrate.

Mao Tse-tung's attack on the entrenched bureaucratic hierarchies of China—and the mentality which produces such structures—during the Cultural Revolution is perhaps more comparable. The extreme left wing of Turkish intellectuals may have been on this Mao'ist path in the 1960's. Certainly the target of their attack was the class system of the Republic. They were in revolt against the entire social fabric of Turkey with its complacent peasantry, well-to-do local gentry, and relatively comfortable town-dwellers, and the revolt was launched by young men often closely related to the embattled bureaucratic elite and its entourage. Some of the most fervent fire-breathers turned out to be sons of generals and admirals. They had taken up arms against the mass parties and popularly elected Parliament under the banner of social justice. This attack, which culminated in the anarchic activities of the so-called Turkish Liberation Army, was naturally undertaken in the name of the masses and appeared to include a veiled attack on the bureaucratic apparatus as well. It is interesting that if, indeed, the attack had been successful—by which we mean the highly unlikely picture of Turkey behind the Iron Curtain in the Balkans—it would have brought about the dictatorship of a single party similar to those in Eastern Europe and would have enhanced the power and position of a new set of elite, bureaucratic *apparatchiks*, themselves fairly closely related to the old set of bureaucrats.

It is not for nothing that that shrewd observer of the Middle East, Khedouri, remarks that there are only two classes in the Middle East, the ruler and the ruled. It has been so for a long time. The really revolutionary nature of the Turkish democracy and its free elections was that the ruled were about to become the rulers, as indeed the ex-General Secretary of the CHP (the party of the Atatürk revolution), Ecevit, and the leader of the right-wing AP, Demirel, both recognize with great clarity. They have never tired of saying it.

It is apparent that in both China and Turkey the clash between Western and Asian civilization first seems to produce a suspension of belief altogether and a lack of commitment, at least in the minds of the intellectuals. This seems to be the basic reason for secularism, which is a curious ideology and, in its political form at least, the result of an erosion of one culture by another. The weaker is pitted against the prestige and power, the science and materialism associated with the West.

The lack of commitment between ideologies, the uneasy coexistence, does not seem to last. Sooner or later it seems to turn into a commitment to available alternatives: either Nationalism, a return to a nostalgic past, or a plunge into an uncertain future. It is this last plunge which generates the greatest interest in Marxism-Leninism, since unlike Western humanism, it

is both universalistic, apparently modern in its rejection of the old social arrangements, and a tightly and coherently argued doctrine of social revolution and promise. To frustrated persons struggling with a weakening religious commitment, with infuriatingly ineffective social and political institutions, with the continuing Imperialist gestures of the West it provides a source of ideological coherence, a mantle of scientific doctrine, and a hope of becoming a modern man. The appeal, as many observers have noted before but none as eloquently as Koestler in his *Memoirs*, seems to have an effect similar to conversion. And a conversion it is.

All conversions, one supposes, need an intervening period, a dark interregnum of uncertainty, confusion, anomie, perhaps of pain and humiliation. Times like this make all new departures suddenly seem possible. In more personal terms it is like the breakdown of a marriage, divorce, and, for the optimists, remarriage. There are such dark interludes in the lives of persons, and this seems to be true of peoples as well, even though the cases are rare. In cultural terms we would say that these are cases when the old model is discredited by a sufficiently large and important section of the population for an alternative new model to be reformulated, to take root and be developed.

The second point of theory comes from Edmund Leach. It relates to the analysis of these cases of social change between two poles.

In this book my descriptions of gumsa gumlao and Shan patterns of organization are largely *as if* descriptions—they relate to *ideal models* rather than real societies, and what I have been trying to do is to present a convincing model of what happens when such *as if* systems interact. A sociological description of process in social change, if it is to have any generality at all, must relate to a model of this type rather than to any one particular instance. It is not possible I maintain, to describe such a process of change directly from the observation of first hand ethnographic data. What one must do is first analyze out the ethnographic facts by reference to abstract whole systems conceived as existing in *unstable* equilibrium, and then postulate that the confusion arises from the interpenetration of these unstable ideal system.⁴⁴

I hope I have shown that this is useful. It is a much neglected matter, and Leach was the first to point out the fertility of this approach in brilliant detail.

The third theoretical point concerns charisma and change. A good deal of my analysis depends upon a neo-Weberian view of stasis and dynamics of cultural models. There are undoubtedly cases of stasis in the anthropological repertory. There are many descriptions of societies working in a satisfactory fashion with a particularly well-articulated cultural model. There is indeed a beautiful anthropological myth that somewhere a society exists which is pristine and entirely integrated. Frederik Barth gave a lecture recently on a society totally isolated and only recently contacted in New Guinea.⁴⁵ It certainly gave the impression of a wholesome integrity in which nature, experience, social, cultural, and religious life appeared like a

well-oiled mechanism. The total number of persons were 183 souls. The forms were well-established. The symbols of the system penetrated through the whole culture.

I have been thinking of the opposite case, when the symbolism has broken down and much desperate confusion marks the scene.

The cases which demand our attention are those messy ones with a degeneration and disintegration of old forms and a regeneration and reintegration of new forms. The midpoint, that dismal but fertile interregnum of anomie, the dissolution of Proudhon, is critical. Weber never really analyzed this, and Durkheim did not say much about it either. But Weber has drawn the outlines in the process of the regeneration of forms. He has written of charisma (at least in its personified form), of routinization and the final establishment of traditional—legal—rational authority. He has not seen this in cyclical terms and has not analyzed that critical process of the loss of charisma in outdated institutions, in those too inflexible, unworkable systems. These are conditions in which the superstructure is out of phase with the infrastructure and collapses under its own weight. It is only after a period of disintegration and dissolution that the search for new charisma begins and the opportunities for the new charismatic leaders arise.⁴⁶

These observations on Cultural Revolutions are intended to draw attention to the gargantuan dimensions of the task of transforming “traditional” societies. Evolution may simply not provide a sufficiently speedy timetable. Revolution must inevitably destroy. The more central and effective it is, the greater the destruction. The period of rebuilding that may follow—for the likelihood of the disintegration of the body politic is not negligible—must deal first of all with the problem of order in its most general sense. This involves beside political, social, and economic order the establishment of goals, the sense of purpose, and direction. This used to be called “destiny,” a word which is used with noteworthy insistence by the myth-makers of the non-Western world.

The problems of economic growth, the rise in the marginal productivity of labor, are of course interwoven into this story. One may recall the bizarre experiment with backyard smelting furnaces in the Communes during the Great Leap Forward in China. But these economic problems, though a vital part of the design of the future, pale in significance when seen in the immediate perspective of near revolutionary politics. Even when there are parliaments and free elections, as in Turkey, the memory of the social and cultural cataclysm may be too near for the leaders to be able to devote their full energies to the growth of the economy. In the din of post-revolutionary politics the economic effort becomes displaced and fragmented. It is surely instructive that the most successful effort at economic growth of a non-European country has taken place in Japan, a society whose central institutions and historic national traditions were

successfully preserved against the tide of millenarian cultural revolutions. That luxury was not available for Turkey and China. There appear to be very few countries in Asia where conditions of stability, respect for traditional political institutions, effective economic organization, and pragmatic leadership are combined for a repetition of the Japanese "Great Leap Forward."

REFERENCES

1. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Free Press, 1964).
2. Oversimplifying, these mean, respectively, rational behavior directed towards "ultimate values" (patriotism, religion, etc.) and rational behavior directed towards "immediate ends."
3. H. A. R. Gibb, "The Reaction in the Middle East Against Western Culture," delivered in 1971 in Paris, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, eds. S. J. Shaw and W. R. Polk.
4. Charles F. Gallagher, "Contemporary Islam: The Straits of Secularism," American Universities Field Staff Reports, *Southwest Asia Series*, 15, No. 3 (1966).
5. See Overture, *The Raw and the Cooked* (New York, 1970), pp. 9-10 for Levi-Strauss' own explanation of his progress from Kinship to Mythology; on the behaviorist bias, see Edwin Ardener, "The New Anthropology and its Critics," *Man*, 6, No. 3 (September 1971).
6. Claude Levi-Strauss, *La Pensée Sauvage* (Paris, 1962).
7. *Ibid.*, p. 174; "Tethnologie est d'abord une psychologie."
8. *Ibid.*, p. 311.
9. The work of H. Bechert in particular must be singled out as a striking exception. See his *Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft in den Ländern des Theravada Buddhismus*, vol. 1 (Frankfort, 1966); vol. 2 (Wiesbaden, 1967).
10. M. Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
11. Erbakan's party was outlawed and Erbakan tried in secularist courts for his non-secularist ideas in 1971.
12. Aziz Ahmad, *An Intellectual History of Islam in India* (Edinburgh: University Press, 1969), p. 15.
13. J. N. D. Anderson and N. J. Coulson, "Islamic Law in Contemporary Cultural Change," *Saeculum XVIII*, 1-2 (1967), p. 14.
14. Webster, *New International Dictionary of the English Language*, 2nd edition (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1959).
15. Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History*, p. 247.
16. Fazlur Rahman, "Islam and the Constitutional Problem of Pakistan," *Studia Islamica*, 32 (1970).

17. *Ibid.*, p. 276.
18. *Ibid.*
19. On the intellectual history of modernism in Pakistan, see Aziz Ahmad's brilliant study, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964* (Oxford: University Press, 1967).
20. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967).
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 175-176.
22. Bechert, *Buddhismus; Staat und Gesellschaft in den Ländern des Theravada Buddhismus*.
23. G. E. Wheeler, "Soviet Central Asia," in "Islam in Politics: Symposium," *The Muslim World*, Hartford Seminary Foundation, 56, No. 4 (1966), p. 239.
24. T. Z. Tunaya, *Turkiyede İslamcılık Cereyani* (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1962).
25. Proudhon writes in 1860, "All the traditions have been used up, all the beliefs are abolished; in turn, the new programme has not been created, or at least it has not entered the consciousness of the masses; hence what I call dissolution. This is the most atrocious moment in the life of societies. Everything unites to desolate men of good will: the prostitution of consciences, the triumph of mediocrities, the confusion of right and wrong, the contortions of principles, the lowness of the passions, the looseness of customs, the oppression of truth, the reward of bad faith. . . . I have few illusions and I do not expect to see reborn in our country, tomorrow, like a flash of lightning, liberty, the respect of law, public honesty, freedom of opinion, good will in the papers, morality in government, reason among the bourgeois and common sense among the plebians.
 "The killings are coming and the prostration which will follow this blood bath will be horrible. We do not detect the work of the new age; we fight in darkness; we must make arrangements to support this life without too much sadness in doing our duty. Let us help one another; let us invite ourselves into the shadow, and whenever the occasion arises, let us be just. . . ." *De la création de l'ordre dans l'humanité, Oeuvres complètes* (Paris, 1927), p. 205f., and p. 187f.
26. Riza Nur, *Hayatım ve hatıratım*, 4 vols. (Istanbul: Altındag Yayinevi, 1967).
27. The authentic element of chance in the reforms comes through with some clarity in these memoirs. As Istanbul was under occupation, and as the Nationalists began to consolidate their position in Ankara, Riza Nur thinks of the future of the State. He feels that the Sultanate, already 600 years old, should continue to provide the legitimacy of the movement. So he writes a letter to one of the Royal Princes in Istanbul, inviting him to escape from the capital under foreign occupation and join the Nationalists, so that, when they win, they should have with them a legitimate link at least with the Imperial House of Osman. This letter is passed on to the occupying powers, and the royal family evidently remains adamantly disposed against the Nationalists. Riza Nur claims that it is this very incident which confirms him in his suspicions that the blood of this Hanedan (lineage) has been much too watered down with all their non-Turkish marriages. (Riza is an unrepentant racist who believes in the genetic and historic destiny of Turanian genes.) Therefore, he goes back to the National Assembly and immediately draws up a bill abolishing the ancient Sultanate in Istanbul by the will of the Nationalist Legislature in Ankara. He claims that Mustafa Kemal had no idea of doing this, but only

- chanced upon Rıza as he was collecting signatures for his bill in the corridors of the Assembly. This incident, which is of some general interest, should be checked in the Archives. If true, it would throw some more light on the enigmatic and dominating personality of Atatürk.
28. For a superb study, see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961 and 1965).
 29. There are some suggestions that the script in Turkey was changed to fit in with the Soviet moves of changing the scripts of the Central Asian and Caucasian Turkish Republics. The Soviet, as is well known, changed the Muslim scripts of the USSR first into Latin, and after Turkey followed suit, into Cyrillic. The matter has not received much attention.
 30. Some aspects of the prelude to the Spanish Civil War seem very suggestive. Hugh Thomas writes superbly of this period in Spain, *The Spanish Civil War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961); see also G. Brennan, *The Spanish Labyrinth* (Cambridge, Eng.: The University Press, 1943).
 31. "During his youth, he went on, he only imagined that the revolution would attain victory. At that time he thought that revolution was quite simple; it was only after suffering several setbacks that he learned how to make revolution from the teachings of the Communist party Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
 "After the triumph of the revolution, according to Marxist-Leninist principles and Chairman Mao's thoughts, he said, *the revolution must be carried on continuously to win complete victory over the reactionaries.*" Chou En-lai, *The New York Times*, May 21, 1971, p. 10.
 32. The reformist party (CHP) usually gets a popular vote of between 29-42 per cent.
 33. Metin Toker, *Milliyet*, 14.v.71.
 34. Yasar Kemal, *Milliyet*, 19.iv.71.
 35. Mehmet Akif, quote by Tunaya, *Turkiyede Islamcilik Cereyanı*.
 36. Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East and the West* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964).
 37. Gallagher, "Contemporary Islam: The Straits of Secularism."
 38. Bechert, *Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft in den Ländern des Theravada Buddhismus*.
 39. Reported in *Cumhuriyet*, September 3, 1971, with the banner headline "This is a trial for progress and civilization."
 40. C. K. Young, *Religion in Chinese Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 365.
 41. *The Great Cultural Revolution in China*, ed. Asia Research Centre (Tokyo, 1968).
 42. Maurice Freedman, "Why China?" *Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute for 1969* (London).
 43. For an excellent account by an anthropologist, see C. P. Fitzgerald, *The Birth of Communist China* (Pelican Books, 1964); see also S. Schram, *Mao Tse tung* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1966), and Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse tung* (Pelican Books, 1969). For more detailed accounts, see *Party Leadership and*

Revolutionary Power in China, ed. J. W. Lewis (Cambridge, Eng.: The University Press, 1970); see also F. Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

44. E. Leach, *Political Systems of Highland Burma: a Study of Kachin Social Structure* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 285.
45. Lecture at the University of Chicago.
46. Some of these problems concerning "charismatic-revolutionary" leadership, in contrast to "bureaucratic-pragmatic" (Anglo-Saxon), and "ideological" (Soviet third generation) leadership are examined with remarkable clarity in an important article by Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," *Dædalus*, 95, No. 2 (Spring 1966). His types may be identified as second generation concepts from Weber: thus, charismatic (Maoist), traditional (Soviet), and rational (Anglo-Saxon) authority. His analysis of the relationship between these types of leaders and the relation between the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and China is quite penetrating.